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Abstract  
Demand side financing strategies have been a popular means of increasing coverage and 
availability of effective maternal and child health services in low and middle income 
countries (LMIC).  However, most research to date has focused on the effects of demand side 
financing on the use and costs of care with less attention being paid to how they work to 
achieve outcomes. This study used a mixed methods evaluation to determine the effect of a 
targeted health insurance scheme on access to affordable quality maternal and child care, and 
assess implementation fidelity and how this affected programme outcomes.  
Programme effects on service access, affordability and quality were evaluated using 
difference in difference regression analysis, with outcomes being measured through facility, 
patient and household surveys and observations of care before the intervention started and 
eighteen months later. A simultaneous process evaluation was designed as a case study of the 
implementation experience.  A total of 90 in-depth interviews (IDIs) and five focus group 
discussions were conducted during three rounds of data collection among respondents from 
management, facility and community. The scheme achieved high coverage among the target 
population and reduced the amount paid for antenatal and delivery care; however, there was 
no effect on service coverage and limited effects on quality of care. The lack of programme 
effects was partly due to the late timing of first ANC visits and registration for the scheme 
together with limited understanding of entitlements among beneficiaries and providers.  
Better communication of programme benefits is needed to enhance effects together with 
integration of such schemes within existing purchasing mechanisms and in financially 
decentralised health systems. 
Keywords: demand-side-financing, insurance, access to care, affordable, equity, Tanzania  
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Introduction  
While notable progress has been made in reducing maternal and newborn mortality rates, 
many low and middle income countries (LMIC) still fall short of targets (Cohen et al., 2014). 
Inequity in coverage of essential health services during pregnancy and the postpartum period 
remains a key factor impeding progress in maternal outcomes. Access to and use of maternal 
and child health care services is often constrained by demand and supply side barriers. On the 
demand side, the costs of seeking and receiving care can limit access, and in the case of 
deliveries, can be unpredictable and potentially catastrophic (Storeng et al., 2008). On the 
supply side, poor quality of care at facilities, and the limited choice available to women in 
rural areas also constrains access (Macha et al., 2012). 
In recognition of these constraints, LMIC governments have implemented a range of 
strategies to improve care delivery at the facility and to incentivise users to seek timely care. 
Demand side financing, or strategies to incentivise the use of specific services by reducing 
financial barriers to care seeking (Bowser, Gupta, & Nandakumar, 2016),   include selective 
removal of user fees (McKinnon, Harper, Kaufman, & Bergevin, 2015), the distribution of 
vouchers (Bhatia & Gorter, 2007), conditional cash transfers (Lagarde, Haines, & Palmer, 
2007) and health insurance (Morgan et al., 2013). Voucher schemes and health insurance can 
increase patient choice by removing financial barriers to care seeking, whilst also potentially 
incentivising providers to deliver better quality care (Grainger, Gorter, Okal, & Bellows, 
2014). 
Evaluations of voucher schemes in LMIC have found they can be successful in increasing 
coverage of facility-based deliveries and reducing the costs of care seeking for the services 
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covered (Ahmed & Khan, 2011; Bellows, Kyobutungi, Mutua, Warren, & Ezeh, 2013; Bhatia 
& Gorter, 2007). Similarly evaluations of the impact of user fee removal have generally 
found evidence of increased coverage of institutional deliveries (Hatt, Makinen, Madhavan, 
& Conlon, 2013; Leone, Cetorelli, Neal, & Matthews, 2016; McKinnon et al., 2015). Health 
insurance has also been associated with increased service coverage and financial protection in 
many low income settings (Bhageerathy, Nair, & Bhaskaran, 2016; Habib, Perveen, & 
Khuwaja, 2016; Spaan et al., 2012), including in relation to maternal health services 
(Comfort, Peterson, & Hatt, 2013).  
However, most research to date has focused on the effects of demand side financing on the 
use and costs of care with less attention  to how they work to achieve outcomes (causal 
pathway) (Gopalan, Das, & Mutasa, 2014), and how the design and implementation of these 
programmes affects outcomes (Grainger et al., 2014). Understanding how implementation 
affects the way the programme works and eventual outcomes can support the optimisation of 
programme design (Blamey & Mackenzie, 2007). The aim of this study was to evaluate the 
effect of a targeted health insurance scheme on access to affordable quality maternal and 
child care, and to assess implementation fidelity and how this affected programme outcomes 
in Tanzania.  
Methods 
Study Setting  
Tanzania made substantive progress in reducing mortality for children aged 1–59 months 
between 2000 and 2012, but progress for neonatal and maternal mortality was much slower 
(Afnan-Holmes et al., 2015), with less than seventy percent of births in health facilities 
(TDHS, 2016).  
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The Tanzanian health sector is highly dependent on out-of-pocket payments accounting for 
28% of total health expenditure (MoHCDGEC, 2018).  Care for pregnant women and 
children under five years of age is officially free at public facilities; however, in practice, 
exemptions for these groups are not systematically implemented (Kruk, Mbaruku, Rockers, & 
Galea, 2008). The Tanzanian government is committed to ensuring greater access to 
affordable care through the expansion of health insurance in the country. There are two main 
insurance schemes providing coverage for the population. The National Health Insurance 
Fund (NHIF) is a mandatory scheme for the formal public sector which also allows other 
individuals to opt into the scheme with varying premium payments in exchange for free 
outpatient and inpatient care and surgeries at all government facilities and accredited faith-
based and private for profit facilities meeting pre-defined quality standards. Less than 10% of 
the population are covered by the NHIF (MoHCDGEC, 2018).  
Scheme Description 
In 2010 the NHIF with technical support from GFA Consulting group and funding from the 
German Development Bank, KfW, Institute for Health and Social Research (Institut für 
Gesundheits und Sozialforschung GmbH, IGES) and Mennonite Economic Development 
Associates (MEDA) began providing free NHIF cards to poor women during pregnancy and 
for up to three months after delivery in Mbeya and Tanga regions. While KfW was intending 
to finance a voucher scheme, national level stakeholders in Tanzania were committed to work 
through health insurance rather than introducing a new system. The scheme is a form of 
demand side financing as the intention was to stimulate demand for maternal and child care 
services by removing financial barriers associated with care seeking among these groups.  
Similar to vouchers, the scheme was also intended to increase consumer choice over 
providers of these services.  The scheme was entitled ‘The Helping Poor Pregnant Women 
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Access Better Health Care Project’ hereafter referred to as the ‘KfW scheme’. Initially the 
scheme adopted individual targeting to identify the poor (Borghi et al., 2015). However, the 
scheme subsequently shifted to geographic targeting (Borghi et al., 2015).  
The KfW scheme was intended to work as follows. First, health workers were to inform 
women about the scheme, which was also advertised through posters at health facilities.  To 
benefit from the scheme, women had to complete a registration form at the facility, which 
was transferred to the district level by health workers and then submitted to the NHIF zonal 
office. The NHIF was to issue cards for the women, however, as this process took time, in 
mid-2012, it was decided that women should have immediate access to benefits, and for her 
insurance number to be written on her ANC card by the health care provider at the time of 
registration. Health care facilities were to claim and get reimbursed from the NHIF based on 
the services used by the beneficiaries. In turn health care facilities would use the revenue 
generated from the project to improve facility infrastructure, procure medical supplies and 
drugs to improve the quality of care.  
Figure 1 presents our theory of change for how the KfW scheme would improve access to 
affordable quality care in Tanzania. By providing free care from non-public providers, the 
scheme was intended to improve choice and demand for care during pregnancy and the 
postpartum, improving maternal and child health outcomes. On the supply side, the scheme 
was intended to generate more revenue for public providers, by reimbursing services that are 
typically provided for free, which would lead to improvements in quality of care, if these 
additional resources are invested in service delivery.  
A variety of assumptions underpinned the theory. Notably, that the intervention would be 
implemented according to the program design and adjusted to local realities (Damschroder et 
al., 2009). Beneficiaries needed to understand the benefits of the scheme and providers 
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needed to understand the process involved in registration of women, offering free care and 
claiming reimbursements. In order to obtain reimbursements, providers had to complete and 
submit claims, and revenue needed to be appropriately invested to deliver better quality care 
for the increasing volume of clients. Additional demand from pregnant women could also 
have had a knock on effect on other patient’s care seeking, in terms of longer waiting times. 
The theory of change assumed that the costs and choice constraints were the main barriers to 
care seeking.  
Outcome evaluation 
Study Design  
We used a controlled before and after study to assess the impact of the KfW scheme on 
access to affordable and effective health care in one intervention district, Mbarali, in Mbeya 
region, and one comparison district, Kilolo, in Iringa region (Borghi et al., 2015). The study 
methods and study design are explained in detail elsewhere (Borghi et al., 2015). In brief; the 
districts were selected as they had similar baseline coverage of a community based health 
insurance scheme, the Community Health Fund (CHF), and similar poverty and literacy rates, 
population density and population per health facility. A baseline survey was carried out in 
April and May 2012 and a follow-up survey was carried out between January and February 
2014. The intervention started in Mbarali district in the last quarter of 2012.  
Data Sources 
The health facility was our primary sampling unit. We sampled from all facilities accredited 
by the NHIF within the selected districts. All government and faith based hospitals and health 
centres in each district were automatically selected. A random sample of 22 dispensaries 
which offer reproductive and child health (RCH) services were selected from each district. A 
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total 49 facilities were sampled (25 in Mbarali and 24 in Kilolo), representing over 60% of all 
facilities in both districts. The aim of the sampling procedure for the health facility survey 
was to seek district representation; therefore, no sample size calculation was carried out.  
We collected data using four sets of tools. A facility survey assessed the availability of drugs, 
medical supplies, equipment, and utilities at the facility. At each facility we undertook twelve 
exit interviews and observations of client-provider interactions with patients receiving ANC 
or PNC. The exit interviews were used to estimate out-of- pocket payments while the 
observations of care done by medically trained interviewers estimated waiting and 
consultation time and health worker adherence to national clinical care guidelines.  
Interviews with women who had delivered a child in the past 12 months were conducted with 
households in the catchment areas of selected facilities (n=60 per facility catchment area, 
stratified in terms of wealth) (Borghi et al., 2015).Women’s surveys collected data on the 
costs and quality of antenatal and delivery care and care seeking during pregnancy, delivery 
and the postpartum as well as household socio-economic characteristics. A total 1,500 
households were sampled in each study arm per survey round.  
Outcome Measures 
We measured the effect of the scheme on the share of women having any ANC (ANC) and 4 
or more visits, the timing of ANC, and institutional deliveries, the timing of postnatal care 
(PNC), and family planning, and the share of children under 1 having had three childhood 
immunisations (diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis [DPT], measles and polio). We measured the 
effects of the scheme on the likelihood of paying for antenatal, postnatal or delivery care, and 
the average amount paid, as well as giving gifts and the value of gifts. We generated indices 
of content of care for ANC and PNC based on observations of care, comprising 12 and 9 
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items respectively. An index of content of care for ANC was also generated from the 
household survey based on care provided over all ANC visits received during pregnancy, 
based on 20 items. An index of interpersonal care for ANC and PNC were generated from 
exit interviews, based on 13 items, and an index of interpersonal care for delivery care was 
generated from the household survey based on 11items. An index of facility quality based on 
drug and supply availability was generated based on 6 items from a facility survey.  The 
indices were generated as a mean score across items included in the index ranging from a 
minimum of 0 to a maximum of 1.  
To assess equity in outcomes, a wealth index was generated based on ownership of household 
assets and housing particulars. Three terciles of equal size were generated from the wealth 
index: poorest, middle and least poor.  
Data Analysis 
We identified the effects of the KfW scheme on outcomes using a linear difference in 
difference regression analysis with facility and year fixed-effects, as shown in Equation 1.  
Equation 1: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐾𝑓𝑊𝑗  × 𝛿𝑡) +  𝛽2𝛿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
We also controlled for individual-level characteristics (education, religion, marital status, 
occupation, age, number of pregnancies) and household characteristics (insurance status, 
number of household members, household head education, and wealth based on ownership of 
household assets and housing particulars) that are known to affect outcomes (𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡).The effect 
of the scheme on outcomes is estimated by 𝛽1. To assess whether the scheme had differential 
effects by socio-economic status, we interacted the intervention variable with the time 
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dummy and the household wealth terciles. The difference-in-difference approach relies on the 
parallel trends assumption.  While this assumption can never be formally tested, we verified 
that trends in a number of outcomes were similar between the intervention and comparison 
areas prior to the introduction of the scheme.  
Process evaluation 
The process evaluation was designed as a mixed methods case study of the process of 
implementation in Mbarali district. We examined implementation fidelity, which we defined 
as implementation of /adherence to the essential steps in the theory of change, positing that 
the outcomes of the program were dependent on achieving each of these. 
Population enrolment by socio-economic status and duration of exposure as well as 
knowledge of the intervention among the population was measured through the household 
survey described above.  Evidence on implementation in relation to these and other steps in 
the theory of change were generated through qualitative data.  We conducted 90 in-depth 
interviews (IDIs) and five focus group discussions during three rounds of data collection: in 
May 2012; after one year of implementation in November 2013; and in May 2014. 
Respondents comprised of: women beneficiaries of the scheme, men from beneficiary 
households, community leaders, health facility managers and staff at three health facilities (a 
government hospital, health centre and dispensary), council health management team 
members, and regional officials, as well as NHIF managers at zonal and national levels (S2 
File). Sampling was carried out as follows: three facilities were chosen to represent different 
levels of care and with high caseload of deliveries and from different parts of the district.  
Community level respondents were sampled from the poorest village in the catchment area of 
sampled facilities.  Community leader contact information was provided by district managers 
and community leaders identified other community respondents.  Interviews were carried out 
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in privacy near respondent homes/workplaces.  Focus group discussions were conducted at 
the village office or dispensary veranda.   
Guides for the qualitative interviews/focus groups were developed in English with questions 
relating to the implementation of the programme and key steps on the theory of change. They 
were subsequently translated into Swahili by the bi-lingual Tanzanian researcher who was 
involved in data collection.  Interviews and focus groups were conducted by two research 
assistants (RA) (including senior researchers), fluent Swahili speakers with previous 
experience conducting qualitative research who received training on the topic, the guides and 
research ethics. Respondents were informed about the study and written consent was obtained 
prior to conducting the interview. Interviews and focus groups were digitally recorded and 
subsequently transcribed and translated into English  
After data collection, all data were cleaned by two of the researchers. Analysis was conducted 
to determine implementation fidelity in relation to the theory of change and reasons for 
implementation variation.  After conducting axial coding using NVIVO, summaries and 
indicative quotes were analysed through framework analysis comparing the respondent 
level/type and time period for each of the codes (Bradley, Curry, & Devers, 2007; Carroll et 
al., 2007; Damschroder et al., 2009).  While a number of themes were explored in the 
analysis, the results in this paper focus on the findings related to implementation fidelity for 
selected essential steps in the theory of change. 
Results 
Outcome evaluation 
Demand-side effects 
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The characteristics of women and households across intervention and comparison sites were 
generally similar (S1 File).  
The KfW scheme had no effect on the utilisation of ANC, deliveries, postnatal care or 
childhood immunisation or family planning (Table 1.1). While there was an increase in the 
proportion of women having four or more antenatal visits, postnatal visits within two months 
of birth and deliveries taking place in a facility in the intervention area, there was a similar 
increase in the comparison area.  Additional deliveries were more likely to take place in 
public than non-public facilities in the intervention area. Coverage of immunisation and 
family planning reduced in the intervention district within the period of evaluation with no 
evidence of intervention effect.  
There was no evidence of a programme effect on the probability of paying for ANC, but the 
amount paid reduced by TZS 95.72 (95% CI: -205.9; +14.5; p=0.087) (1 USD was equal to 
1600 TZS in 2013); (Table 1.2). The probability of paying for delivery care halved as a result 
of the intervention but the effect was not statistically significant (Table 1.2). There was a 
reduction in the amount paid for deliveries by TZS 6,237 (95% CI: -10429.8, -2043.1; 
p=0.004). There was no evidence of programme effect on the probability of paying for PNC 
or of giving a gift or the value of the gift (Tables 1.2). 
Supply-Side Effects 
There was a positive effect of the KfW scheme on the overall PNC content of care score, 
driven by history taking, tests and examinations performed on the mother, and interpersonal 
care (Table 1.3). However, PNC content of care scores reduced over time in both intervention 
and comparison areas, but to a lesser extent in the intervention than the comparison area. 
There was no evidence of programme effect on the ANC content of care index or on waiting 
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time or consultation time for antenatal or PNC. However, there was a significant reduction in 
the proportion of women from intervention areas indicating that waiting time was too long. 
The KfW scheme had no effect on women’s satisfaction with interpersonal care, facility 
opening hours or the stock our rate of drugs and medical supplies (Table 1.3).  
There were no differential wealth effects noted for any of the significant outcomes. 
Process evaluation 
Implementer awareness 
Qualitative data revealed that, district managers were responsible for ensuring that the 
scheme was rolled out according to the design. Health care providers received no official 
training and often did not fully understand the scheme. 
“We were late to understand that once we have filled the form, we have already 
generated money; but after being educated we realized that as we continue filling the 
forms we are increasing the facility income.” (Health facility in-charge)  
District and facility level respondents felt the lack of awareness was due to a lack of 
leadership. The District Medical Officer was on study leave at the scheme’s launch.  Upon 
his return a year later and the arrival of a new NHIF coordinator, informal on-the-job training 
was conducted during routine supervision visits to health facilities, helping to reduce errors 
and misunderstandings over time.  Levels of knowledge of the scheme were strongest at the 
district hospital, closer to district management, and weakest at dispensaries further from the 
headquarters.  
Population awareness 
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Providers and district managers reported that women were briefed about the scheme during 
ANC.  However, many of the women in qualitative interviews were not able to describe the 
scheme nor the services covered.  Some women described the scheme as: ‘helping people 
with HIV’ or as ‘covering the baby until one year’. Fathers confused the programme with 
standard exemptions and other long running programs such as hati punguzo (free bed nets) 
and had differing understanding of the length of insurance coverage. None of the women or 
men interviewed mentioned that the card enables free care from any facility, including private 
facilities.  
“What they do is they take the form, as they fill the form they write the number. Now if you 
just write the number without telling the woman its benefit, it is true that she will not see the 
benefit.” (District respondent) 
While the original design included engagement of community leaders, it was only after a year 
and a half of implementation that the district team elicited their support in increasing 
enrolment.   
Registration process 
Qualitative interviews with all respondents revealed that there were initially numerous errors 
in completing enrolment forms and failures to assign an insurance number to the woman’s 
ANC card. As a result, when women went to other health facilities, they were sometimes 
enrolled again, or providers were unable to submit claims. 
In facilities with a high case load, the forms initially tended to run out very quickly creating 
shortages.  Furthermore, in smaller facilities with limited staffing, providers were not always 
able to devote the necessary time for enrolment.   
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“Yes, it leads to overwork because normally you need to spend about 40 minutes with 
a mother, but there are about fifty women to be attended and you are alone.  How are 
you going to attend to patients and at the same time there is the enrolment for the 
KfW program?” (RCH health provider) 
Over time, the district was able to resolve many of these challenges, and consequently 87% 
of household survey respondents were able to show their ANC card proving they had been 
enrolled in the KfW scheme. According to NHIF records, 14,440 women were enrolled in the 
scheme in the year 2013/2014 (1st April 2013 to 31st March 2014), which when considered 
against 2012 population census data, corresponds to approximately 100% coverage.  
Women could have up to 11 months of coverage with the scheme if their first ANC visit 
occurred after one month gestation.  However, in practice, the household survey found 
women went for their first ANC visit at 27.5 weeks, limiting their coverage to 6.9 months.  
Officials at district and regional levels focused on ignorance and cultural beliefs as the main 
reasons that some women might not have benefited to the full extent rather than 
implementation challenges.  
Receipt of free services 
Community members reported they were generally not required to pay when they sought 
maternal and newborn care services, whereas they had previously paid for  a number of 
items.  
“In the past… The nurse advised us to prepare money for transport, gloves, thread to 
tie the baby’s cord, plastic to cover the bed, a bucket to keep water… But now they 
are just telling us to prepare clean clothes for when the baby is born and we do not 
buy those medicines.” (Woman who delivered in the last six months)  
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Some women perceived that insurance card holders received services more quickly, spent 
less time queuing at facilities and appreciated the lower costs of care. 
“once you arrive and when they see this card you will be treated very well.” (Woman 
who delivered in the last twelve months) 
One woman reported that some women were yelled at for not having the card and were 
charged.  Other women and men interviewed said that the attitudes of the providers 
remained poor. 
“The service is good but the service provider brings a bad impression on the 
service.” (Male FGD participant) 
Providers explained that women often “shift” or “disappear” during the pregnancy and 
delivery period to be with a relative or due to the agricultural seasons.  Several providers 
focused on the movements of the semi-nomadic Sukuma population who may move in and 
out of the region.  
Reimbursement  
Provider interviews revealed that the process for submitting reimbursement claims was the 
same as the usual NHIF claim process.  The only variation was that KfW provided funding to 
the NHIF to pay these claims.  Health providers indicated that they were familiar with the 
claim forms and felt it was part of the job they were used to doing; however, claims were not 
always filled out where there were limited staffs, or staffs were unaware of the scheme. 
 “You can find yourself bringing someone to the theatre and at the same time another 
one is in labour so we can sometimes forget to fill the forms. If there were enough 
staff there would be no problem.” (Health provider) 
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“…last week, I looked at the register book. I found there were about 30 women who 
gave birth, but only 10 forms were filled for the KfW claims. So I learned that people 
were not well instructed.” (Health Facility In-Charge) 
District respondents reported that there were mistakes in reimbursement forms, such as not 
including all services provided, which may mean that the claim will be rejected. They are 
now processing many more forms, which creates more opportunity for error.  Some facilities 
may not see NHIF clients frequently, especially in remote areas. 
Staff were also unclear whether funds had been received and how funds from reimbursements 
could be used. They felt that additional tasks had been taken on by the facility with no 
perceived benefit.   
 “More money is coming but we do not know where they are going. They promised 
they will give us some allowances but we wait in vain.” (Health provider) 
They also expressed concerns about increased demand for services, without the ability to 
respond to the demand, due to a lack of sufficient medicines and supplies. Many 
providers and district level respondents felt the most important problem to address was 
the availability of ‘working tools.’ 
 
While the reimbursements were intended to address these issues, at end-line the KfW funds 
had not yet been disbursed to health facilities and were being retained, though not spent, at 
district level. In addition, concerns about spending the extra finances wisely and following 
appropriate accountability mechanisms delayed spending, and thus the expected quality 
improvements did not occur.  
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Discussion 
The study aimed to evaluate the effect of a targeted health insurance scheme on access to 
affordable and effective care and to assess implementation fidelity. Intervention and 
comparison sites experienced similar increases in maternal care service use. However, 
deliveries were more likely to take place in public facilities as a result of the intervention. 
The lack of effects on utilisation was partly due to the late timing of women’s’ first ANC 
visit and registration for the scheme. A lack of understanding of entitlements among 
beneficiaries meant the scheme was unable to extend provider choice. This was compounded 
by a lack of understanding among providers about the scheme, due to limited training.  
However, the scheme reduced the amount paid for antenatal and delivery care. There was 
very limited programme effect on quality of care, likely due to inconsistent completion of 
claim forms due to a lack of training, and lack of time. Furthermore, NHIF reimbursements 
were held at district level and these had not been passed on in cash or in kind to facilities at 
the time of the study.  
The KfW scheme achieved much higher coverage among the target population than reported 
elsewhere (Njuki et al., 2015; Pilasant et al., 2016). This was partly linked to a simple 
enrolment process not requiring documentation or photographs from the beneficiary. 
Geographic targeting helped ensure all women were covered, limiting exclusions , political 
capture of the programme (Hunter & Murray, 2017), and stigma linked to being identified as 
poor (Pilasant et al., 2016). 
Our finding of no programme effect on maternal health service coverage is comparable to 
studies of demand-side financing in India, which used a similar quasi-experimental design to 
our own (De Costa et al., 2014; Mohanan et al., 2014). However, studies from Bangladesh 
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(Ahmed & Khan, 2011; Nguyen et al., 2012), Pakistan (S. Agha, 2011; Sohail Agha, 2011) 
and Uganda (Ekirapa-Kiracho et al., 2011) reported positive effects on antenatal, delivery and 
postnatal care use. Studies in Cambodia and Kenya reported mixed effects (Bellows et al., 
2013; Van de Poel, Flores, Ir, O'Donnell, & Van Doorslaer, 2014) (Amendah, Mutua, 
Kyobutungi, Buliva, & Bellows, 2013; Bellows et al., 2013; Francis Obare, Warren, Abuya, 
Askew, & Bellows, 2014). However, these were mostly observational studies and were 
unable to fully control for potential confounders.  
Although the KfW programme targeted the poor, we found no evidence of differential effects 
by socio-economic status, possibly due to the geographic targeting. Evidence from voucher 
programmes elsewhere have generally reported higher use of vouchers among the poor 
(Ahmed & Khan, 2011) (Eva, Quinn, & Ngo, 2015; Grainger et al., 2014). 
Our finding of partial programme effect on financial protection contributes to a limited 
evidence base on this issue and is consistent with findings from a voucher scheme Kenya (F. 
Obare, Warren, Kanya, Abuya, & Bellows, 2015) and reviews of targeted health insurance 
schemes for the poor (Dror, Chakraborty, Majumdar, Panda, & Koren, 2016; Habib et al., 
2016). Other studies have found that demand side financing programmes have been 
ineffective in covering the full set of costs (Hunter & Murray, 2017).  
Ours is one of the few studies to examine the effect of demand side financing on quality of 
care (Hunter, Harrison, Portela, & Bick, 2017) with only one quasi-experimental study 
identified reporting improvements on postnatal quality in Kenya (Watt et al., 2015).   
One of the factors explaining the lack of programme effect on utilisation in our study was the 
limited awareness of the programme among clients and providers, an issue also reported in 
Kenya and Myanmar, (Abuya et al., 2012; Njuki et al., 2015; Pilasant et al., 2016). While the 
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KfW scheme had no specific awareness raising activities, other than posters at facilities, 
studies have found that radio spots were an effective means of raising awareness (Bua, Paina, 
& Kiracho, 2015) and networks of women’s or community groups (Powell-Jackson et al., 
2009). Such measures would be important to ensure maximum future programme 
effectiveness. The lack of provider training in the KfW scheme was a further constraint, in 
some cases this also affected capacity to complete insurance claims for scheme beneficiaries. 
However, providers were familiar with the insurance claim process as the scheme was 
integrated within an existing insurance scheme, rather than introduced as a standalone 
programme as is typically the case for vouchers, where more problems were experienced by 
providers with submitting claims (e.g. (Abuya et al., 2012)). The integration of the scheme 
within an existing insurance scheme may have helped to limit fraud, an issue reported with 
voucher schemes (Bua et al., 2015), as the insurance agency has systems in place to ensure 
compliance on the demand and supply side. Our findings suggest that the governance 
structures around funding flows for demand-side schemes can impact their effectiveness.  In 
this case, there was a lack of financial autonomy at facility level with reimbursements linked 
to the scheme being retained at district level and subject to strict spending rules. As a result, 
funds remained largely unspent and providers were not able to access and use the additional 
resources to improve quality of care.  Where facilities have their own bank accounts, 
providers may be able to better access programme resources and improve quality. 
 
Smaller facilities were less able to manage additional workload associated with registering 
women on the scheme, similar to a study in Kenya (Njuki et al., 2015). Increased demand 
also resulted in long waiting times, and stock outs in the Uganda study (Bua et al., 2015), 
though this issue was not raised by respondents in our study.  
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The study suffered from a number of limitations. The time frame of the evaluation was 
relatively short, implementers were learning over time and effects were likely to improve 
further going forward. We were unable to assess to what extent a lack of improvement in 
supply side factors limited uptake by women, though this has been reported as a factor 
constraining the effect of vouchers (Rob, Rahman, & Bellows, 2009). Our assessment of 
process quality relied on observations of care, which may suffer from the Hawthorne effect, 
though this effect would have been the same in both study arms. The use of community 
leaders to identify respondents in communities may have shaped how the respondents 
understood the purpose of the research, and therefore what they told the researchers. Lastly, 
we were unable to test some of the assumptions underpinning the theory of change, nor how 
context may have affected implementation, which would be important areas for future 
research. 
In conclusion, limited awareness among providers and beneficiaries limited the impact of the 
programme on service use, and its revenue generating potential.  Structural factors such as the 
lack of financial autonomy for primary care providers limited their ability to benefit from the 
additional resources generated by the scheme and to further invest them in quality 
improvements. The recent national roll out of bank accounts at primary care level in Tanzania 
will go some way to alleviating this problem and increasing the potential of the scheme to 
improve quality going forward (Kuwawenaruwa et al., 2018). 
The experience of this programme has also shown that embedding financial incentive 
programmes within existing purchasing arrangements (such as social health insurance in this 
case) is advantageous in terms of facilitating provider compliance with programme 
implementation and ultimately ensuring longer term sustainability. Going forward, demand 
side financing schemes should ensure an adequate communication strategy for providers and 
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beneficiaries is embedded within the programme design, and careful attention should be 
given to the financing architecture surrounding the implementation of such schemes. 
Schemes may be more likely to improve the supply side if they are integrated within existing 
purchasing mechanisms and in financially decentralised health systems. 
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Table 1.1: Effect of the KfW scheme on use of maternal and child health services (1212) 
 Initial Survey Follow up Survey Difference in Difference, impact 
 Intervention  Comparison  Difference Intervention  Comparison  Difference n Fixed Effects β [95% CI] P-value % share of baseline  
ANC           
Any ANC visit at facility (%) 99.2 99 0.2 99.5 99.1 0.4 4949 0.0[-0.0, 0.2] 0.953 0.0 
Received 4 or more visits (%) 57.2 53.7 3.5* 63.6 59.3 4.3** 4924 0.0 [-0.1, 0.1] 0.952 0.0 
Timing of first ANC visit, weeks mean 33.9 32.4 1.6*** 27.5 24.7 2.8** 4924 0.1[-2.6, 2.8] 0.948 0.27 
Intrapartum Care           
Facility birth (%) 79.6 88 -8.4*** 86.5 94.1 -7.6*** 4949 1.0[-0.0, 0.1] 0.739 1.3 
Public facility birth (%) 63.6 71.3 -7.7 71.9 73.5 -1.6 4949 4.0[-0.1,0.1] 0.440 6.3 
Non-public facility birth (%) 16.0 16.6 -0.6 14..6 20.6 -6.0 4949 -2.9[-0.1,0.1] 0.450  18.1 
Postpartum Care           
PNC in facility<2 months of birth (%)  16.9 18.8 -1.9 29.2 36.6 -7.4*** 4949 -3.0[-0.2-0.1] 0.641 17.8 
No. of PNC visits, mean  1.5 1.6 -0.1 2.0 1.9 0.1 590 0.5[-0.5-1.5] 0.381 30.7 
Timing of first PNC in days post-delivery, 
mean  
17.1 12.9 3.8*** 14.4 11.3 3.1*** 1205 1.2[-5.0, 7.4] 0.699 7.0 
Vaccination           
DPT - all 3 doses – card (%) 73.3 75.5 -2.2 61.2 61.4 -0.2 4949 -1.0[-0.1-0.1] 0.890 1.4 
Measles – card (%) 15.1 14.9 0.2 12.2 13.6 -1.4 3998 -5.0[-0.1-0.0] 0.118 33.3 
Polio – all 4 doses – card (%) 81.3 81.8 -0.5 70.4 68.9 1.5 4949 -2.0[-0.1-0.1] 0.680 2.5 
Family Planning           
Family planning current use (%) 31.9 28.6 3.3* 26.0 25.7 0.3* 4871 -3.0[-0.1 -0.1] 0.538 9.3 
*** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.   
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  Table 1.2: Effect of the KfW scheme on Out-of-Pocket Payments for Health 
 Initial Survey Follow up Survey Difference in Difference, impact 
Interventi
on  
Comparis
on  
Differen
ce 
Interventi
on  
Comparis
on  
Differe
nce 
n Fixed Effects β 
(95% CI) 
p-value % share of 
baseline ANC           
Paid something (%) 5.2 3.4 1.8** 4.0 3.4 0.6 4949 -0.7[-3.2, 1.8] 0.564 13.5 
Paid something public facility (%) 3.4 2.9 0.5 3.7 2.0 1.7** 4139 0.5[-1.7, 2.6] 0.668 14.7 
Amount paid in TZS, mean  144.2 66.5 77.8 73.5 190.1 -
116.6**
* 
4949 -95.7[-205.9, 14.5] 0.087 66.4 
Amount paid public in TZS, mean  76.3 51.9 24.4 61.6 115.5 -53.9 4139 -34.7[-141.6, 72.2] 0.518 45.7 
Paid a gift (%) 1.4 1.0 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.0 4949 -0.00[-0.01, 0.02] 0.878 0.0 
Value of gift in TZS, mean  62.8 19.6 43.2** 66.8 28.6 38.2 4949 0.1[-71.5, 71.7] 0.998 0.2 
Intrapartum Care           
Paid something (%) 21.4 19.3 2.1 10.5 19.6 -9.1*** 4949 -8.2[-19.2, 2.8] 0.141 38.3 
Paid something public facility (%) 9.4 9.3 0.1 6.7 7.5 -0.8* 4949 0.9[-4.2, 6.2] 0.707 9.6 
Amount paid in TZS, mean  8836.5 3123.4 5713.1* 2527.9 3336.2 -808.3* 4949 -6236.5[-10429.8, 
-2043.1] 
0.004 70.6 
Amount paid public in TZS 
public, mean  
1414.8 
[9409.6] 
1491.8 -77.0 1481.3 1367.9 113.4 4949 85.4[-1070.6, 
1241.3] 
0.883 6.0 
Gave gift (%) 15.5 13.3 2.2 14.7 16.2 -1.5 4949 -1.6[-8.2, 4.9] 0.623 10.3 
Value of gift in TZS, mean  915.6 560.4 355.2** 1070.4 907.4 163.0 4949 -6.1[-457.8, 445.6] 0.979 0.7 
Postpartum Care           
Paid something (%) 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.4 0.4 4949 0.0[-1.3, 1.4] 0.944 0.0 
Paid something public (%) 0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.8 0.5 0.3 4949 0.6[-0.2, 1.5] 0.183 300.0 
Amount paid in TZS, mean  90.9 37.6 53.3 86.7 120.1 -33.4 4949 -3.9[-198.0, 190.1] 0.967 4.3 
Amount paid public in TZS, mean  19.7 27.1  -7.4 47.7 24.6 23.1 4949 74.0[-39.6, 187.6] 0.197 375.6 
Gave gift (%) 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.0 1.0 0.0 4949 -0.1 [-1.2, 1.0] 0.878 33.3 
Value of gift in TZS, mean  9.2 9.0  0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 4949 -1.7[-17.8, 14.4] 0.831 18.7 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.   
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Table 1.3: Effect of KfW Programme on Quality of Care  
 Initial Survey Follow up Survey Difference in Difference, impact 
Intervention Comparison Difference Intervention Comparison Difference N Fixed Effects β 
[95% CI] 
P-value % share 
of 
baseline 
ANC - Content and experience of care – 
observations of patients 
0.42  0.41  0.01 0.43  0.36  0.07 388 0.09 [-0.10, 0.27] 0.339 21.4 
ANC - Content of ANC care index (mean), 
HH survey   
0.69 0.77 -0.08*** 0.73 0.79 -0.06 4949 0.01[-0.03, 0.04] 0.669 1.4 
PNC - Maternal care – overall 0.19  0.27  -0.08 0.17  0.15  0.02 387 0.18 [0.06, 0.30] 0.002 94.7 
PNC - Infant care – overall 0.72  0.68  0.04 0.51  0.48  0.03 387 0.19 [-0.11, 0.48] 0.217 26.4 
PNC - Interpersonal care 0.71  0.75  -0.04 0.69  0.72  -0.03 387 0.24 [0.03, 0.46] 0.025 33.8 
PNC - Overall 0.54 0.57  -0.03 0.45  0.45  0 387 0.20 [0.02, 0.39] 0.028 37.0 
Time for services           
ANC Consultation time  -minutes 25.21  22.55  2.66 26.24 25.30  0.94 343 -3.40 [-13.7, 6.87] 0.509 13.5 
PNC Consultation time  -minutes  21.96  19.98  1.98 15.21  14.89  10.32** 377 6.05 [-5.93, 18.0] 0.314 27.6 
Facility quality Index (mean)  0.67  0.64  0.03* 0.72  0.75  -0.03 942 -0.04 [-0.09, 0.02] 0.147 6.0 
Medicines and supplies           
Index drugs 0.31 0.29 0.01 0.36 0.45 -0.09 98 -0.10 [-0.35, 0.14] 0.398 32.3 
Contraceptives 0.34 0.41 -0.07 0.24 0.22 0.02 98 0.09 [-0.21, 0.39] 0.562 26.5 
Medical Supplies 0.28 0.26 0.03 0.22 0.20 0.02 98 -0.01 [-0.26, 0.25] 0.969 3.6 
Equipment with problem < 90 days 0.02 0.06 -0.03* 0.06 0.06 -0.01 98 0.03[-0.06, 0.11] 0.556 150.0 
Facility function            
Electricity (%) 28 50 -22 48 50 -2 98 0.17[-0.3, 0.6] 0.459 0.6 
Water (%) 84 100 -16.0** 72 45.8 26.2* 98 0.46[0.1, 0.9] 0.034 0.5 
Toilet (%) 96 100 -4 96 95.8 0.2 98 0.04[-0.2, 0.3] 0.694 0.0 
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level.   
 
 
